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There is a strange sympathy between the atmospheric particles that float 
through the sky and the human beings who migrate across the ground and 
then across the sea. Each body sets the other into motion—a pattern of move-
ment and countermovement. The particle bodies flow from north to south; the 
human bodies move from south to north. The difference in the kinds of bodies 
is apparent in the models used to grasp their character: on the one hand, there 
are the physical and chemical explanations used to model the climate system, 
and on the other hand there are the anthropological and psychological expla-
nations used to model human character. Thus, the contact between human 
bodies and atmospheric bodies is the contact between these different kinds of 
models, the consequences of which are delineated in this story. 
The global climate model is actually a series of submodels that are refined 
until they capture the causal structure of the climatic problem to be repro-
duced. In climate modeling, as in other forms of simulation, the trick is 
to somehow reproduce enough information to catch what is relevant in a 
problem—no more, no less. A working model of causality is really just a 
reliable explanation of a problem that has been formalized. In terms of scale, 
this form of modeling operates like a mesh, the apertures of which must be 
tuned to catch elements of just the right size. Do you calibrate it to catch the 
weather pattern, the cloud formation, or the water droplet? It depends on 
what you want to explain. Scale is what organizes this objective relationship 
between the problem and the model. 
Histories of explanation and representation solidify around problems, 
meaning that we inherit conventions in knowledge production, perhaps none 
more important than the division of knowledge production itself into scalar 
categories. These categories emerge both as an objective reflection of the 
phenomena in question and the social, political, and economic decisions to 
orient scientific attention in one direction over another. 
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Left, a carbon dioxide molecule under the microscope; right, satellite imaging of human migration.
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New kinds of problems—like climate change, for instance—pose special 
challenges insofar as they bring together the large and the small, the near 
and the far, the fast and the slow, the weak and the strong, making a mess of 
existing scalar conventions, as they now do. The history of scale in climate 
science is an example. In the study of climate, signs must be extracted from 
a vast sea of scalar variability—this sea of cycles and oscillations span from a 
nanosecond quick flicker of infrared to the half-million-year passage of our 
astronomical seasons with all of the endless flux in between. Climate science 
has to extract individual rhythms from this cacophony. It has to work out 
what makes a rhythm, what makes it switch tempo, play more insistently with 
more syncopation or just plain out of time. 
Scientists obviously set out to explain a wide range of problems through 
climate models. Even if the ground of verification differs, we find some-
thing similar when we look at models of human subjectivity. Here, the aim 
has always been to use the signs of external conduct to construct a model 
of internal motivation, to understand the way that conduct emerges out of 
natural dispositions—or, as Michael Fehre has beautifully put it, according to 
a schema of conflict between good and bad propensities, such as charity and 
greed, passion and reason, shame and self-worth. Models of subjectivity are 
supposed to explain what causes human beings to behave the way they do. 
What happens, then, when environmental models intercept models of human 
character? How do social modeling and scientific modeling inflect each 
other? Examining changes across a band of arid land in central Africa may 
help to demonstrate the inextricability of social and scientific modeling, and 
consequences of this encounter. 
“Desertification” refers to the process by which arable land becomes non-
productive, usually as a result of poor land management. For scientists like Jule 
Gregory Charney, the term became a kind of conceptual paradigm through 
which to understand the case of the Sahel and the severe drought that beset 
the region in the 1970s and 1980s. Essentially, what later became known as 
Diagram illustrating scales of scientific inquiry, Adrian Lahoud, 2015.
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the Charney Hypothesis claimed that indigenous mismanagement of land was 
leading to a loss of soil and vegetation, and, more importantly, that this loss 
was changing the reflectivity of the earth’s surface, resulting in less rain. The 
account took hold of the Western scientific imagination; in their view the people 
of the Sahel had become weather-makers of the most self-destructive kind. 
The two different models described above converge to account for the phe-
nomenon. First there is a generalizing and reductive explanation that attributes 
land degradation to the people’s character. The literature from the period 
refers to the farmers’ inability to reason, to plan, to calculate properly—that 
is, to their irrationality—but also to their inflexibility, to a lack of capacity 
to adapt their actions to changing circumstances. The other model of expla-
nation involves the behavior of the environment in response to their actions: 
the irreversible damage to the earth’s surface triggered positive feedback in 
the atmosphere, which then caused drought. The intersection of these two 
models gives us a specific geopolitical paradigm: man-made desertification. 
The consequence of this paradigm was a disastrous legacy of ill-conceived aid 
packages, reforms, and interventions. 
In the last decade, however, climate science has finally confirmed a saying 
of the Zaghawa people in Chad: The world dies from the north. The sever-
ity of the Sahelian drought made it a perfect object to train generations of 
climate models upon. What climate scientists finally deduced—counter to 
the prevailing narratives—was that the oceans were driving the drying of the 
Sahel. The first clue in this detective story was a set of models that correlated 
ocean temperature to precipitation, indicating that the heat in the ocean was 
acting like a pacemaker for the monsoon. 
 However, the relationship between heat and rain was still only part 
of the picture—something was missing. The models could reproduce the 
signal, but not its strength. Something else was driving the ocean tempera-
ture. Was it global warming? Answering this question was complex. What 
scientists found was that drying depended on a balance between two forces. 
The first was the temperature difference between cold and warm water in the 
tropics; the second was the temperature of the troposphere. Instability in the 
first would tend to more rain, while stability in the second would tend to more 
drying. The victor would drive precipitation patterns. 
The balance of power was poised until an unlikely protagonist tipped the 
scales. As if in homage to Lucretius, fate would be decided by the infinitesimal 
Desertification Schema from “Anthropogenic Causes of Desertification in Western Sudan,” Fouad Ibrahim, 1978.
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swerve of a particle. Most people associate global warming with carbon 
dioxide. But fossil fuels produce another byproduct: aerosols. For some time 
science has been aware that European and American aerosol emissions were 
changing the temperature of the oceans. Scientists hypothesized that this 
was weakening the temperature gradient that was so crucial to precipitation 
patterns. Aerosol particles are unlike carbon dioxide in that carbon dioxide 
is long-lived and disperses evenly, which is why we can talk about parts per 
million as a global concentration. Aerosol particles are short-lived. They get 
lifted up in air currents, carried through the atmosphere, and then deposited. 
Their effects, therefore, are far more localized. Unlike carbon dioxide mole-
cules, which are identical, every single aerosol particle is individual. 
This character is what makes them so intractable scientifically but also so 
revealing politically. Individuality is what allows science to identify the source 
of the particle. Like a fingerprint on a crime scene or a tracing in an atmo-
spheric bloodstream, aerosols tell us a great deal about the structure of the 
great aerial oceans and the way that their currents redistribute the conse-
quences of human and nonhuman actions. For example, aerosol deposition 
Microscopic image of aerosol particles, each with its own identifiable form.DR
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in the Amazon tells us that, astonishingly, a small, dried-out lake bed named 
Bodélé in Chad has been secretly supplying the rainforest with nutrients for 
years. Saharan dust carried dozens of kilometers over the Atlantic has been 
fertilizing an Amazonian garden. In the case of the Sahel, it does something 
less metaphysically but more politically suggestive. 
Is aerosol dispersion caused by European and North American industri-
alization significantly contributing to a drying in the Sahel? We don’t really 
know. But the question itself is an unusual one, and its unusualness reveals 
blind spots in the way climate change is thought of and discussed. It’s not, 
“What is the acceptable average temperature?” It’s not, “What is the global 
concentration of carbon dioxide?” It’s not a we-are-in-it-together kind 
of question, because it’s not posed at the scale of the planet or the globe. 
It suggests that actions in one limited part of the world affect actions in 
another limited part of the world, even over great distances. It’s a different 
kind of question because it’s posed at the scale of specific people and their 
fate, which is the scale of lived histories, not their negation into a universal 
humanity. And therefore it’s a paradigm of a differently scaled politics. 
Interestingly, as the model of the environment changed, so did the mod-
els used to understand human behavior. The first shift was to recognize the 
incredible cultural and linguistic diversity of the region. The second was to 
recognize the diversity of forms of life: For example, conceiving of a gradient 
of sedentary and nomadic life where East to West differences yielded sim-
ilar territorial practices, but different clans and North to South differences 
yielded both different territorial practices and ethnic groups. As Alex De Waal 
has shown in his account of famine in Darfur Sudan, looking at the same 
socioecological diagram from the perspective of the herders, one sees a check-
erboard of new nomadic opportunism, in which pastoral routes are used to 
avoid farms.1 These models rely on an understanding that what we sometimes 
take as an essentialist ethnic marker is usually a marker of activity: i.e., you can 
be an Arab by being a nomadic pastoralist. Indeed there is a certain pragmatic 
fluidity but also a precarious tension between these livelihoods that is exacer-
bated under environmental duress. Finally, these models are informed by an 
awareness of indigenous environmental concepts: for example, the absence of 
statistical forms of reasoning about precipitation, and in their place something 
more like a qualitative rather than a quantitative model. Together these factors 
radically invert the previous concept of the Sahelian farmer plagued by irratio-
nalities and a kind of stubborn ancient inflexibility, instead offering an opposite 
notion in which the autonomy and flexibility of indigenous farmers and the 
intelligence of their land use strategies has come to be acknowledged, albeit in 
a context of extreme global environmental stress. While using these different 
models in concert has produced a more nuanced and accurate understanding 
of the social and climatic changes in the region, it does not alter the fact that 
the Sahel remains caught in a situation not of its own making. Social stress is 
still being exacerbated by nonlocal environmental factors, and a great diasporic 
movement of people is still heading to the major cities on the West African 
coast and north toward Europe and the Mediterranean.
The southward trajectory of aerosols and their effect on the climate of the 
Sahel and the northward trajectory of migrants attempting to flee sub-Sa-
haran Africa and enter Europe aligns in a pernicious geometry. What gets 
emitted as a particle returns as a refugee; what is received as a refugee gets 
returned as a particle. Movement and countermovement. In this drama, 
Edmond Locard’s principle that every contact leaves its trace, the very 
1
Alex de Waal, 
“Sudan, the Sahel, 
the Sahara: the 
99% Principle,” 
Les Dossiers du 
CERI 3 (Summer 
2001), 9.
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cornerstone of modern forensics, still applies, but with a complicated catch. 
The contact and the trace drift apart. Environments loosen the bonds between 
cause and effect, obscuring the link between attribution, responsibility, and—
potentially—justice. 
What, then, does “justice” mean here? During the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Conference, the public debate was framed by two simple questions: 
Would an accord be signed or not? And what would be an acceptable average 
temperature increase? Would it be 1.5 degrees, 2 degrees, or 2.5 degrees? 
Unbeknownst to the G77 group of developing nations, the Danish had been 
circulating a secret text exclusively among the G20 that proposed a 2-degree 
global average temperature increase. When it was discovered, the Sudanese 
diplomat representing the G77, Lumumba Di-Aping, called an impromptu 
press conference, saying “We’ve been asked to sign a suicide pact.” He called 
it the colonization of the sky, and finally declared it “climate genocide.” The 
proposed average of 2 degrees meant 3.5 degrees in many of the nations that 
Di-Aping represented, which would be a catastrophic result for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Di-Aping’s claim was an attempt to reestablish the proper political 
scale within a debate about temperature increase in order to prevent specific 
populations from being effaced by the coarseness of the model. 
The conference was a failure. What it revealed, however, was a certain 
calculus of life and death concealed in every model. If images belong to a 
kind of evidentiary paradigm and a symptomatology of signs, then perhaps 
models belong to a speculative paradigm, a kind of etiology of causes. The 
model is an observation and a hypothesis. It’s both the data that constitutes 
it and a claim made from that data. But insofar as the model is the means 
by which scenarios can become rehearsed, it’s more than a representation of 
possible futures. They become a medium through which the present produces 
the future, though somewhat speculatively. 
The Conference of Parties (COP) framework sits at the summit of a vast 
collective scientific endeavor, but the evidentiary paradigm that forms its 
foundation presupposes too much. First, it assumes a good faith in the forum 
and in the way political change flows from understanding. It also presupposes 
a common regime of intelligibility—shared stakes, institutions, and protocols. 
In other words, it presupposes so much of what the world lacks. So where 
does this leave architecture and design? The way that models of the envi-
ronment intercept models of human subjectivity is a crucial area of inquiry, 
and one in which architecture and design can intervene. We need to find a 
way to think of these two things—environment and subjectivity—together, 
but in light of the failures of COP 15 and the more recent, but nonetheless 
extremely limited, agreements borne of COP 21, can we imagine an intersec-
tion that doesn’t presuppose as much faith in the functioning of the forum? 
That doesn’t presuppose a common regime of intelligibility but instead starts 
with a proposition that embodies the asymmetry of the situation?
The anthropologist Alfred Gell proposes a thought experiment that might 
offer a useful way of answering this question and, importantly for us, for 
understanding the role of design within this paradigm. It involves two figures: 
the hunter and the trapper. Evidence always requires an interlocutor, and the 
hunter, who is sensitized to science, stands in for this evidentiary regime, for, 
in a sense, discursive power. Science also requires a figure able to reconstruct 
a spatial and historical explanation from a series, so the hunter is the first to 
narrate an event. (Of course Nimrod, the biblical figure of the hunter, as we 
know, is responsible for the Tower of Babel.) Finally this narration requires 
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a forum—like a book or a conference—in 
which the story can be retold. The power 
of the hunter is an explanatory power, 
grounded in the interpretation of signs 
within a space of shared intelligibility. This is 
the paradigm through which climate science 
has primarily been pursued.
The second figure is the trapper. Gell’s 
text on “Vogel’s Net” is really an extended 
thought experiment in which he mounts an 
imaginary exhibition of animal traps. Gell’s 
work on traps embodies an asymmetry of 
legibility. At the very least, the trap is an 
object that works best when it is unintelligi-
ble to its subject. At most, the trap embodies 
something absolutely essential, which is 
a kind of fundamental inequality between 
beings. To work well, the predator must 
A Giraffe trap and a rat trap from “Vogel’s Net: Traps as Artworks, Artworks as Trap,” by Alfred Gell, 1996.
A Giraffe trap and a rat trap from “Vogel’s 
Net: Traps as Artworks, Artworks as Trap,” 
by Alfred Gell, 1996.
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understand the behavior of the prey. The most successful trapper is the one 
who is closest to the animal itself—the trapper who grasps the behavior or 
the prey in all the dimensions of its character and makes a device that embod-
ies the concept of its character. 
The trap rarely embodies the form of the prey, though sometimes it does, 
as in the humorous giraffe trap. More often, it embodies something essen-
tial in the prey’s character, such as the propensity of the rat to burrow. The 
trap expresses the ambition of the predator to catch the prey. Therefore, the 
trap is a designed object in which the character of the prey intersects with 
the intention of the predator. The chimpanzee trap, for example, solicits the 
natural curiosity and intelligence of primates. “The thread is very thin and the 
chimpanzee thinks it can get away,” recalls a member of Cameroon’s Fang 
community, Ze. “Instead of breaking the thread, instead of pulling the thread, 
it pulls on it very gently to see what will happen then. At that moment the 
bundle with the poisoned arrow falls down on it, because it has not run away 
like a stupid animal, like an antelope would.”2 The trap preys on the primate’s 
ability to balance its instinct with its intelligence. A small thread captures 
something essential in the character of its subject, better than an image. 
The animal trap turns the personality of the animal against it. This is why 
traps always have a tragic dimension. If we train ourselves to look at archi-
tectural and environmental traps, we might be able to extract a portrait of the 
character of the prey or, more precisely, a portrait of the point of intersection 
at which the character of the prey and the intention of the predator meet. In 
architecture, power never touches the human directly. It addresses the human 
through the life world in which the human subject exists as a set of alter-
native, conflicting potentials. Environmental determinism would suggest a 
direct correspondence between climate or geography and the character of the 
human being, as if an unbroken line of causality chained the human character 
to the strength of the sun.3 But in environments, we never find lines of cau-
sality without fields of uncertainty. This uncertainty is not only what tempers 
the strength of our predictions or what qualifies the veracity of our claims. 
It is the terrain of political struggle itself. Architecture’s role in this struggle 
might be to contribute a particularly uncertain kind of trap, lacking in virtue 
and good faith, patient, malevolent, living and residing in our blind spots, the 
amoral, anti-Enlightenment object par excellence.
Adrian Lahoud is dean at the School of Architecture, Royal College of Art London.
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